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RECENT CASES
sustain such a tax.15 The taxable incident must not lend itself
to repeatable taxes in other states.16 The multiplication of
taxes would erect a barrier to interstate commerce, the exact
thing the Commerce Clause prohibits.17 Flaws in our system
of taxation among the states make possible numerous inci-
dences where a buyer may be subjected to multiple taxation.'8
This is the case where the buyer takes delivery in his own
equipment and. actually transports the goods to another state.
Both the sales tax of the Selling state and the use tax of the
consuming state may be applicable. 9
There appears a need for uniform legislation in the field
of state taxation of interstate commerce. The possibility of
multiple taxation is ever present when a buyer accepts deliv-
ery to himself in the seller's state. Presently many states
including North Dakota impose a sales tax although the inter-
state effect of the transaction is assured. The U. S. Supreme
Court should strike down this tax as being a direct burden
on interstate commerce when the factual situation assures an
interstate transaction.
DON COOKE
CONFLICT OF LAWS - WRONGFUL DEATH RECOVERY UNDER
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT - CONFLICT OF LAWS RULE
APPLIES AS WELL AS INTERNAL LAW OF PLACE OF NEGLIGENCE.
- The petitioners are the personal representatives of passen-
gers killed when an American Airlines plane crashed in Mis-
souri while enroute from Tulsa, Oklahoma, to New York City.
The cause of the crash was traced back to the overhaul depot
in Tulsa where an unsafe cylinder was placed in one of the
engines. Petitioners brought suit against the United States
in the Federal District Court in Oklahoma basing their claim
on the failure of the Civil Aviation Agency to exercise proper
surveillance of practices employed by the airlines in maintain-
ing their aircraft. Petitioners had already received a $15,000
settlement from American Airlines which was the maximum
15. Memphis Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 87 (1948).
16. Case of State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232 (1872); Memphis Gas Co. v.
Stone, 335 U.S. 87 (1948).
17. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
18. See Note, 46 Va. L. Rev. 1051 (1960).
19. Ibid.
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amount recoverable under the Missouri Wrongful Death Act.'
They now seek additional amounts from the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act 2 by applying the Oklahoma
Wrongful Death Act 3 which contains no limitation on the
amount recoverable. On appeal the Supreme Court of the
United States held that petitioners could not obtain further
relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act or under the Okla-
homa Wrongful Death Act. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S.
1 (1962).
Three alternatives faced the court in determining the choice
of law to be applied: (1) The internal law of the place where
the negligence had its operative effect; 4 (2) the internal law
of the place where the negligence occurred; 5 or (3) the intern-
al law as well as the conflict of laws rule of the place where
the negligence occurred.6
The court, in excluding the first alternative, concluded that
Congress intended in the Federal Tort Claims Act that the
government's liability should be determined in accordance
with the law of the place where the negligence occurred.7
Special note was taken of the wording of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, which states that the government shall be ad-
judged liable as an individual would be under similar circum-
stances. The court concluded that this would require liability
to be determined in accordance with the internal law as well
as the conflict of laws rules, thus adopting the third alterna-
tive. However, the government is not always treated as an
individual would be under state law for in certain instances
Congress is specific in directing a departure from state law.'
1. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.090 (1949). (Since commencement of these actions
the Missouri Code has been amended to allow for maximum damages of
$25,000. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.090 (1959).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 2674 (1958).
3. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, §§ 1051-1954 (1951).
4. United States v. Marshall, 230 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1956).
5. Voytas v. United States, 256 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1958); Eastern Air-
lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
6. Hess v. United States, 259 F.2d 285, 291 (9th Cir. 1958). (The Court
noted that the Union Trust interpretation, if followed, does violence to 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) since the government is not held liable in the same manner
and to the same extent as a "private person under (like) circumstances");
Landon v. United States, 197 F.2d 128 (2nd Cir. 1952).
7. 28 U.S.C. 88 1346(b), 2674. (The government shall be treated "in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.").
8. Ibid. That the government shall be liable "in the same manner as a
private person would be under similar circumstances".
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) Permits claimants to sue only in the federal
courts, and not in the state courts which are available in actions against
a private individual; § 2401(b) specifically prescribes a period of limita-
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The principal argument against this holding is that there
could result indefinite oscillation between the situs of the
negligence and the situs of the death if the conflicts rules of
the two forums are not in accord; i.e., when the court looks
to the Oklahoma conflicts rule and is referred to Missouri law,
what is to prevent a reference back to Oklahoma law should
the Missouri conflicts rule provide for recovery by applying
the internal law of the situs of the negligence? There exists
a two-fold answer to this perplexity. The great majority of
the states have accepted the general conflict of laws rule that
recovery should be based upon the substantive law of the place
of death or injury.-0 After reference to the conflicts rule of
the state where the negligence occurred, final settlement
would be determined in accordance with the law of the place
of death. Secondly, American courts have generally rejected
the doctrine of renvoi,1" thus precluding any reference to the
conflict of laws rule of the foreign state and look only to their
internal law.1 2 By applying only the internal law of the foreign
state, in this case Missouri, any "endless circuity" would be
cut off and the final settlement would be in accord with the
wrongful death statute of Missouri.
It is this writer's view that the alternative selected in the
instant case is the most desirable. This interpretation is more
flexible in that it allows a federal court to take advantage of
new developments in the conflict of laws area rather than
tions which may be shorter or longer than that of the state; § 2402 claim-
ant cannot obtain a trial by jury under the Act, although he could against
a private individual; (In all these instances Congress was specific in set-
ting up an independent federal rule).
10. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933); Riley v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 24
Misc. 2d 457, 199 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1960); Faron v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 193
Mis.. 395, 84 N.Y.S.2d 568, 570 (1948). (The Court held that where causes
of action against airline company for death of passenger on airplane
which caught fire over N.Y. and crashed in Connecticut were based on
negligence, airline would be permitted to interpose defense that injuries
and death occurred in Connecticut so as to limit right of recovery to
$20,000 which was the maximum allowed under Connecticut death act.)
Gochenour v. St. Louts-San Francisco R. Co., 205 Okla. 594, 239 P.2d 769
(1952). Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 93 (3d ed. 1949) Wrongful death . . .
"The weight of authority is that the law of the place where the injury takes
place applies". RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) "The
place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an
actor liable for an alleged tort takes place"; § 391 reads "The law of the
place of wrong governs the right of action for death".
11. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 10 (3d ed. 1949) "The theory of renvoi
has been the subject of much legal discussion, most of which has rejected
its application in this country in all but a few situations"; See generally
Griswold, Renvol Revisited, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1938).
12. Goodrich, Conflict of laws § 10 (3d ed. 1949); 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1455.
1456 (1955); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (1934)) "When
there is a difference in the Conflict of Laws of two states whose laws are
involved in a problem, the rule of Conflict of Laws of the forum is applied;
the foreign law to be applied is the law applicable to the matter in
hand and not the Conflict of Laws of the foreign state".
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REvIEw




CONTEMPT - DIRECT CONTEMPT - RIGHT OF THE COURT
TO PUNISH SUMMARILY - The defendant, who had continually
interrupted the court in its attempt to examine a witness, was
charged with direct contempt of court and sentenced to
twenty days in jail. The judge sentenced the defendant on the
day after the trial, refusing to allow the defendant to explain
his actions. The United States Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, held, one judge dissenting, that the court had power
to convict the defendant for direct contempt under Rule 42a
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure., The dissent
argued that no one is to be punished under our laws without
the opportunity to be heard. United States v. Galante and
Mirra, 298 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1962).
The power of courts over contempt is practically plenary
and in the absence of constitutional or valid statutory restric-
tions, the exercise of such power should not be questioned by
any tribunal. 2 This power is established to protect courts of
justice and to maintain their dignity and authority.3 However,
the power to punish for direct contempt is not arbitrary. It
must be exercised in accordance with the rules of procedure
established by the courts or prescribed by statute.4 Punish-
ment of contempt committed in the presence of the court is
within the court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed
on appeal, unless the discretion is abused. 5 However, the lack
13. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
Wherein the Court applied the substantive law of the forum, the plaintiff's
domicile, rather that the law of the place of injury, lex locus delietus, for
the reason that it was repugnant to the public policy of the forum-state
to limit wrongful death recovery to the amount prescribed by the lex locus
delietus. (Indicative of a trend to give more recognition to the law of the
state whose interests are most affected); See generally Morris, The Proper
Law of a Tort, 64 Harv. L Rev. 881 (1951); (Critical attack upon the in-
flexibility of the "Last event" doctrine); Note, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 125, 133
(1959); Note, 6 N.Y.L.F. 484 (1960).
1. Fed. R. Crim. P. 42 (a); "CRIMINAL CONTEMPT-SUMMARY DIS-
POSITION-A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge
certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and
that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order for
contempt shall be signed by the judge and entered of record."
2. State ex rel. Grebstein v. Lehman, 100 Fla. 481, 129 So. 818 (1930).
3. Ibid.
4. State ex rel. Rankin v. District Court of First Judicial District,
58 Mont. 276, 191 Pac. 772 (1920).
5. United States v. Bollenback, 125 F.2d 458 (2d Cir. 1938).
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